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"CRIMINALIZATION" AND THE DETENTION OF "POLITICAL 
P R I S O N E R S "  - A N  I R I S H  P E R S P E C T I V E  
MARK FINDLAY 
The contemporary crisis in the maintenance of civil order on both sides 
of the Irish border has initiated unique developments in the "system" 
of criminal justice within Ireland. The government of the Republic and 
the administration of the Province have responded to various attacks [ 1 ] 
on their legitimacy by relying on the controls of the criminal sanction, 
while radically altering the process through which that sanction is applied 
and accorded its full effect. While denying the political nature of the con- 
flict, these governments have cloaked extraordinary social control meas- 
ures in the authority of the rule of law. They would have us believe that 
by relying on the controls of criminal law rather than military force alone, 
violent challenges to their existence are not  attacks on the substance of 
the state. But how they have fundamentally altered the face of the criminal 
sanction to propagate this myth  of normality! And with each particular 
innovation, the broader workings of criminal law in Ireland are certainly 
(and perhaps insidiously) taking on a new significance for the state con- 
trol function. 
As common law jurisdictions, the "two Irelands" provide a unique ex- 
ample of the criminal sanction, as applied by the state, to control political 
dissent. The extraordinary measures recently enacted to deal with the 
perpetrators of violence and terrorism belie the assertion that these acts 
are simply criminal. With this in view, this article analyses the process 
of "criminalization" at various stages within the system of criminal jus- 
tice in Ireland. The ramifications of this policy will receive comment  as 
a natural, and arguably unavoidable coincidence of "criminalization." 
Finally, it is necessary to examine the conflict which underlies the stren- 
uous application of the criminal sanction to activities which are made 
marginal, in terms of politics and crime. As an example of this conflict, 
and different attempts at its resolution, this article examines the deten- 
tion of  political prisoners in the Republic of Ireland. 
N.S.W. Bureau of  Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney, Australia 
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It is regularly argued by those close to the political ferment in Ireland 
at all levels that no true understanding of the conflict, the parties involved 
and the reaction of the state, can be had without an historical apprecia- 
tion of the partition and all that has followed. With certain reservations 
I would agree. However, I would not concede that the unavoidable corol- 
lary of this is that any at tempt to examine a particular feature of "the 
troubles" will unavoidably lead to misconception and oversimplification. 
An example of where a simple expository approach can expand one's un- 
derstanding of the troubles lies in the question central to the nature of 
the problem in the North; why are Protestants killing Catholics and vice 
versa? To see the answer in purely religious terms is not only inaccurate 
but implies a blatant ignorance of Irish social structure. The relevance 
of religion to Irish society is itself unique. Yet the opposing factions are 
not bound together by religious dogma alone and their intransigence does 
not rest solely on religious differences, although these certainly play a 
part. The answer lies in the great social discrepancies that divide Catholic 
and Protestant communities. Economic deprivation, discrimination in 
the provision of housing and employment  as well as unbalanced and un- 
representative political representation, are at the heart of the rupture. 
It is naive to view the resolution of conflict between the Irish commu- 
nities in religious terms alone, as it is to vest one's faith in a simple irre- 
dentist argument. 
Response to the Conflict 
Understanding the nature of these problems, which in turn underlie 
the challenges to the legitimacy of the state on both sides of the Irish bor- 
der, is not the central concern of  this article. Rather, by concentrating 
on the criminal sanction, I will examine the principal strategies (or mod- 
els) adopted by the state in response to such challenges. 
The paramilitary groups responsible for terrorist activities, particularly 
in the North, work within what they perceive as a "war model," where 
their struggle is against an imposed and illegitimate state. They reject Brit- 
ish authority and the mechanisms through which such authority is exer- 
cised. It does not necessarily follow that the state will also adopt a war 
model in response and this is currently not the case [2]. 
Since the 1930s, the two principal strategies for dealing with those in- 
volved in terrorist activities in Ireland have been internment and later "crim- 
inalization." Both the government of  the Republic and the administration 
of the Province have used the army systematically to screen certain sec- 
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tions of the population and arrest and intern certain "suspects" for var- 
ying periods without trial [3]. The strategy is now universally agreed to 
have been a failure. 
The model that is presently in favour has been actively promoted since 
the reactivation of the Special Criminal Court in the Republic in 1972 
and the release of the last internee in the North in 1975. It rests on treat- 
ing terrorists simply as criminals and processing them through the crim- 
inal courts. However, to do this "effectively," it has been necessary to 
radically modify the court system (and in some cases set up unique judi- 
cial institutions), to deal with those involved in anti-state activities. 
In the North of Ireland the present strategy is based on the recommen- 
dations of a Commission of Enquiry under Lord Diplock [4], which was 
charged with the task of recommending arrangements for the administra- 
tion of justice, to deal more effectively with terrorist organizations and 
their members. The Commission's recommendations both in relation to 
police powers and the trial process were extensive and involved radical 
departures from the ordinary criminal justice system, at that time oper- 
ating throughout the Province. In summary it recommended: 
a) that members of the armed forces should have the power to arrest 
without a warrant any person suspected of involvement in or having in- 
formation about terrorist offences, and detain him for up to four hours 
for identification purposes. It is not necessary that the suspect be informed 
of the reasons for his arrest. The Commission also recommended that it 
should be an offence to refuse to answer or to give a false or misleading 
answer to any arresting officer [51. 
These recommendations were broadly followed in the Emergency Pro- 
visions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1973. The Act also provided the police 
with the power to arrest any person suspected of being a terrorist and 
the right to detain him for up to 72 hours. 
b) radical changes in the mode and conduct of the trial. To overcome 
the possibility that witnesses would be intimidated, or that "perverse ac- 
quittals" might be handed down by partisan juries, or even that certain 
admissions or confessions would not be admitted at the trial due to evi- 
dentiary restrictions, a new court system was proposed. It was recommended 
that jury trial be suspended for a large number of existing criminal offences 
that would be scheduled. It was also recommended that the rules of evi- 
dence be altered so as to reverse the onus of proof for firearms charges, 
and to allow for the admissibility of all confessions unless obtained by 
torture or cruel and degrading treatment [ 6]. 
Almost all the recommendations of the Diplock Commission could 
find counterparts already on the statute books in the Republic. The sim- 
ilarity is particularly marked when one compares the "Diplock Courts" 
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in the North with the Special Criminal Court in Dublin. The latter is a 
non-jury court, which entertains less rigid rules of evidence [7] and ac- 
cepts a reversal of the onus of proof in certain circumstances [8]. Per- 
haps the most obvious difference between these two institutions is that 
the Special Court [9] presently sits with a bench of three judges, where- 
as its Northern counterpart is a single judge tribunal. 
Consequences of the "Criminal Court Model" 
It is important to recognise some inevitable consequences of the use of the criminal court model 
whether in a pure, or modified form. The main argument in favour of this approach is that it 
is less likely to cause the kind of communal antagonism which internment and military security 
operations caused amongst Catholic communities in the period from 1971 to 1975. It is also 
more likely to increase the general level of social confidence in the institutions of the state. In 
this sense, reliance on the criminal court model is based on the hope that by keeping as close 
as possible to traditional standards of justice, support for terrorist organizations will wither away 
and they will eventually give up any hope of achieving their objectives by terrorist means. Long 
term success thus depends more on maintaining the consent of the population at large to the 
system of government than on the effectiveness of military suppression [ 10]. 
However, this rests on the presumption that the radical modifications 
to the criminal justice system can be or will continue to be viewed as le- 
gitimate and acceptable features of the "system of government." The ques- 
tion is not merely whether these modifications are justified in the circum- 
stances or even whether they are likely to achieve their underlying ob- 
jectives, but rather " ' . . .  whether those modifications may become so "nor- 
malized'; that the original objective o f  relying on the ordinary criminal 
processes will itself become unobtainable" [ 11 ]. 
There is an obvious contradiction in the state's attempt on the one hand 
to label the acts of "terrorists" in Ireland as purely criminal, while accept- 
ing the necessity that traditional legal guarantees must be dispensed with 
and new institutions created to impose the criminal sanction on such per- 
sons. By responding to the behaviour that they choose to define as crim- 
inal in such an extreme and unusual fashion, the state is reaffirming the 
unique nature of that behaviour. If we are meant to accept the British Prime 
Minister's conviction, that in r_espect of paramilitary violence in the North, 
"a crime, is a crime, is a crime," how can the peculiar processes for con- 
trolling these crimes be both explained and justified? 
Prior to the enactment of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1976, both Conservative and Labour Governments had conceded that 
the paramilitary violence in the Province was a sufficient threat to the 
safety of the state that emergency action, such as internment without 
trial, was introduced in an effort to defuse the danger. The unavoidable 
consequence of this was that such behaviour was viewed by both sides 
as concomitant with a state of war. Although after 1974 there was little 
change in the nature of such pa~military acts of "terrorism" or "subver- 
sion," the state chose to define them as simply being criminal. This in- 
congruous process has come to be known within Ireland as "criminaliza- 
tion." 
It is not essential to first resolve the hoary problem of whether the "anti- 
state" act itself is political or criminal (or somewhere between) in order 
to establish that the state, through criminalization, has confronted a di- 
lemma. The very radical nature of the alterations to the criminal justice 
process is vivid evidence that, in reality, the state does not conceive of 
these acts in the same way that it does other crimes. 
Leaving this contradiction aside, it is interesting to see how these "mod- 
ifications" have overlapped into the wider administration of the criminal 
justice process. Obvious examples of this in each jurisdiction are the wider 
application of the expanded powers of arrest (as contained in the Emergency 
Powers Legislation for Northern Ireland), and the expansion of the juris- 
diction of the Special Criminal Court in the Republic. 
1. The arrest and detention powers, originally recommended by Diplock, 
were extended in the wake of the "Birmingham Bombings." The Preven- 
tion of Terrorism Act, 1974 [ 12] brought the provisions to apply through- 
out the whole of the United Kingdom. For the first time in the peace- 
time history of Britain, statutory law provided for the arrest without a 
warrant of anyone whom a policeman "reasonably suspects to be con- 
cerned with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terror- 
ism" or is guilty of any of a number of new offences under the Act. The 
Act provides for detention without arrest for up to 48 hours, but this 
may be extended with the consent of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, by a period not exceeding five days. 
2. In the Republic of Ireland the Special Criminal Court was originally 
provided for in Part V of Offences Against the State Act 1939 [13]. That 
Act scheduled a number of offences that could be brought before this 
Court. These offences are mainly concerned with firearms and explosive- 
related activities. However, s. 46 of the Act also empowers the Attorney 
General to refer any non-scheduled offence to the Special Criminal Court, 
where he is of the opinion that the ordinary courts are "inadequate to 
secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of pub- 
lic peace and order." 
The Special Criminal Courts have been traditionally viewed within the 
Republic as having a specific and limited jurisdiction to deal with terrorist 
and politically motivated acts of violence. It is the dangers for the general 
community inherent in these particular subversive activities that have al- 
ways been used as the justification for a court that operates without the 
normal guarantees of other judicial institutions. 
However, recently a great variety of "non political" and not apparently 
"subversive" matters have been heard before the Special Criminal Court. 
Almost all major armed robberies (particularly from banks), will be di- 
rected before the Special Criminal Court regardless of whether any po- 
litical motive is apparent. The court now appears to be coming entrenched 
within the accepted panoply of judicial institutions in the Republic. 
If the stated reason for the establishment of the Special Criminal Court 
was the inadequacy of the ordinary courts to administer justice and pre- 
serve the peace in certain "politically marginal" situations, then is it not 
a cause for concern when the particular justification for this judicial aber- 
ration is ignored? Perhaps the real problem lies in the fact that the inade- 
quacy of the traditional court system only became apparent when the 
scope of the criminal justice process was widened to cover these more 
marginal challenges to public peace. 
The Politics of the Criminal Sanction 
Questions as to why the state has chosen this modified court system, 
while still emphasising due process, despite the obvious gap which exists 
between the rhetoric of "the rule of law" and the new procedures, can 
only be answered in political terms. The reliance on "criminalization" 
did not automatically, or necessarily, spring from the failure of intern- 
ment. 
In attempting to deal with the problem of widespread violence through 
the means of repressive force alone, the state risks its legitimacy with a 
large section of the community [14]. The adoption of the policy of crim- 
inalization was an attempt to reduce this risk. 
This approach resembles the response of American courts to the race 
riots in the late 1960s. In describing this problem, Balbus writes, 
The rule of law, due process of law, or formal rationality, . . .  sets definite constraints on the 
ability of political elites to dispose efficiently of collective violence, constraints which they can 
ignore only at the risk of endangering that long-run legitimacy and interest in surveying revolu- 
tionary potential. On the other hand, the immediate pressure to end the violence unavoidably 
dictates the serious abrogations of the principle of formal rationality and hence precisely the 
risk of delegitimation and maximisation of revolutionary potential [15]. 
Balbus identifies a number of advantages which may flow on from using 
the courts to deal with "politically marginal" violence. To begin with the 
courts may be able to influence the way in which the accused perceives 
his acts. By labelling their behaviour as a crime, the actor may come to 
believe that he is criminal. 
One of the central tenets of law is that crime is not an entity in fact, but  an entity in law. Vi- 
olent activities therefore have to be fitted into pre-defmed categories in law. (In legal terms) 
the political character of motivations are irrelevant. The effectiveness of this process of course, 
will depend on the extent of political involvement and the ideological coherence of the partic- 
ipants [16].  
The second advantage of the use of the courts is that it delegitimates 
the claims of the participants. I~Iowever as we have seen, this virtually de- 
pends on whether the courts themselves, and the procedures that they 
adopt, are seen by the community as legitimate. 
A third advantage of the criminalization strategy is to undermine al- 
liances between participants. As long as the actors are seen as criminals, 
at least by the outside world, if not by their local community, then ideol- 
ogical sympathisers are less likely to give them support. Ironically, as Hill- 
yard suggests, they are likely to concentrate on ensuring that the author- 
ities "respect the suspect's rights" [17]. This tends to reinforce the strategy. 
The use of the courts, therefore, to give effect to the process of crim- 
inalization, involves a depoliticization of the conflict. It attempts to turn 
a political conflict into a legal-factional conflict and as such is more con- 
sistent with the long run legitimacy of the state. 
It is interesting that Balbus suggests the criminalization process may 
in fact weaken the state's position due to the obvious divergence between 
the rhetoric of legality and the challenges to the rule o f  law, in practice. 
He emphasises the "'definite constraints" proferred by the rule of law, 
over the state's activities to control collective violence. Yet Balbus fails 
to develop the real distinction between the ideology of the rule of law 
and the structural features of its administration that run so contrary to 
its central tenets. 
E.P. Thompson also seems too ready to invest confidence in the pro- 
tective potential of the '"rule of law," while under emphasising that in re- 
ality it is rarely (or at least very inadequately) realised. Perhaps it is too 
simplistic to view the imperfections and partiality of the law, as indicating 
its subordination to the functional requirements of socioeconomic inter- 
est groups. However, when the ideology of the rule of law can so clearly 
help to legitimise the state's suppression of collective violence and dis- 
sent, while not being translated into the functions of criminal justice at 
the centre of this control process, then the fraud must be exposed. In 
the Irish examples previously referred to, not only is the ideology sub- 
scribed to in the words of the state, rather than through its deeds, but 
in fact the administrative processes of the criminal sanction have been 
so modified as to overcome the "definite constraints" to which Balbus 
referred. 
When talking of the role of the criminal law in eighteenth century Eng- 
land, Thompson observes that: 
Over and above its pliant and instrumental functions, it existed in its own right as ideology; as 
an ideology which not only served, in most respects, but which also legitimised class power [18]. 
It would be difficult to deny the legitimating power of such a sealed 
and self-contained ideology as the "rule of taw." The governments of Ire- 
land have been quick to recognise this. Yet investing such a reliance in 
this ideology, so flagrantly flouted in practice, they risk what Habermas 
has identified as a "crisis of legitimacy." His discussion of functionaries 
within the legal system continues as follows: 
• . .  But these authorities axe part of a system of authority which must be legit,imized as a whole 
if pure legality is to be able to count as an indication of legitimacy. In a fascist regime for ex- 
ample, the legal form of administrative acts can at best have a masking function [ 19 ]. 
Yet as Habermas argues, this masking function is not enough to ensure 
any lasting claim to legitimacy: 
This means that the technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not be able to guarantee rec- 
ognition in the long run, if the system of authority cannot be legitimated independently of 
the legal form of existing a u t h o r i t y . . .  Moreover the organisations which are responsible for 
making and applying the law are in no way legitimated by the legality of the modes of procedure 
(or vice versa) but likewise by general interpretation which supports the system of authority 
as a whole [Emphasis added]• 
In case of the state's use of the criminal sanction to control dissent in 
Ireland, legitimacy will not stand when the formal procedures of the crim- 
inal law do not fulfill their material claims to justice. This will not neces- 
sarily be generated under the new institutional conditions created by the 
state, irrespective of their "legality." 
Perhaps, because of the clear distinction between the reality and the 
rhetoric of the rule of law as evidenced in the Irish examples, it is not 
difficult to simply represent criminal law as masking and mystifying the 
political reality of collective violence in this situation. Such laws do not 
have an "independent history and logic of evolution" [20] separate from 
the political conflict for which they were designed. This "mystification" 
may have little effect on the Catholic population of the North, but it is 
not at them to which it is primarily directed. It is the British electorate 
and the "patriots" in the United States who need to be so convinced. 
Here we are not talking about excesses of judicial or executive discretion 
within the system of criminal justice. Nor are we faced with a conflict 
between arbitrary extra-legal power and the rule of law. Rather we are 
faced with audacious states which seem committed to institutionalise open 
contradictions between the function and ideology of the criminal sanction. 
Yet because of this obvious hypocrisy, it may not follow that since this 
was of necessity so, ideology could turn necessity into advantage. As Thomp- 
son concedes "The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law in 
its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross 
manipulation, and shall seem to be just" [21].  
Once again, in the context of the Irish struggle, the ideology of the 
rule of law is used by the state as more than a mask over ulterior injus- 
tice. The ideology loses its potential to mediate in and control injustice, 
when inequality, partially and selectivity are institutionalised "of  neces- 
sity" within the legal process. Law as ideology then, is even without the 
merit of substituting for the use of unmitigated force. The state chooses 
to use this in tandem with the new forms of "criminal justice." With the 
ideology counting for little more than as a device for legitimacy, the for- 
mal rules and procedures of the law cannot provide what Thompson terms 
"a medium within which other social conflicts [can be] fought out"  [22]. 
These Irish examples do not  merely reveal the perpetual truth of the law: 
that it falls so far short of its rhetoric. They expose the manipulation of 
ideology in the situation of political repression. Therefore the state sees 
no need to dispense with the rule of law in order to defeat the challenges 
to its hegemony. 
Detention of "Political Prisoners" 
The hybrid administrative products of the criminalization process are 
not restricted to the trial situation. Once the act has been identified as 
criminal, and the participants have been convicted, then it is necessary 
that some environment exists within which the criminal sanction can be 
applied to its conclusions. 
After 1972 and the riots in Mountjoy Prison in Dublin, the government 
of the Republic decided to detain all "subversive prisoners" in the one 
institution. To facilitate this, there was a change in the physical structure 
and internal regime of Portlaoise Prison to accommodate its purpose as 
the principal institution for the detention of "subversive" prisoners with- 
in the Republic. The prison was constantly under attack, both externally 
and from within, during the first half of the decade. As a result, the phys- 
ical security of the prison was reinforced in the following ways: 
1. Armed guards now patrol the perimeter walls day and night. 
2. Barbed wire has been mounted  extensively around the prison. 
3. Perimeter security is further ensured by a military presence of both 
men and equipment. 
4. On each segregated landing within the prison, officers of the Garda 
Siochana (police force) complement prison personnel as to internal 
security. 
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Perhaps the most interesting feature of these new developments was 
the way in which the three separate "forces" of state power - the military, 
the civil police, and the prison officers - have combined and been given 
joint responsibility for securing Portlaoise prison. This is a visible expres- 
sion of the Republic's approach to the unique inmates within this insti- 
tution. Rather than being denied, the political nature of their offences 
and their on-going politicality in prison gains de facto recognition by the 
permanent army presence at Portlaoise. This also shows the state's aware- 
hess that the direct association of  the inmates with radical political organisa- 
tions on the outside, who do not accept the criminality of their colleagues' 
actions, or the legitimacy of the government to punish them as such, poses 
an extreme and ever-present threat to the prison. 
It might be suggested that the internal police presence within Portlaoise 
is a further affirmation of a problem that is not simply grounded in consid- 
erations of security. Were this so, the problem could be overcome by an 
increase in the number of prison officers on duty. The introduction of  
police into Portlaoise was as a result of emergency conditions, but their 
continued service within the gaol must have another explanation. It could 
be suggested that besides continued staffing pressures in country prisons, 
the partisan and all-pervasive influence of the Republican movement 
throughout Irish society might necessitate this arrangement as an answer 
to the question, "who guards the guards?" 
Demands of Change 
From 1973 the inmates of Portlaoise Prison were pressing for reform 
of the regime within the prison. These reforms centred on the following 
issues: 
1. deprivation of free access to other prisoner's cells, 
2. requirements to wear prison clothing, 
3. lack of suitable visiting facilities, 
4. absence of proper toilets, 
5. lack of sufficient exercise opportunities. 
Following the riot in December 1974, a number of prisoners refused 
to take food and liquids in support of these demands. The attitude of 
the authorities was intransigent. 
Many demands were made which if conceded, would have weakened security and led to the break- 
down of good order and safe custody within the prison. Privileges were frequently abused and 
there was a general tendency to disregard prison rules and regulations [ 23 ]. 
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This concern for security was reinforced only a short time later when 
a mass escape was at tempted from without and within, involving the use 
of explosives in the recreation hall, and an assault on the outside wall, 
by a specially equipped "tank." 
In 1976 the Visiting Committee conceded in its report that: 
regretfully the Committee had, on numerous occasions, to point out that because of the neces- 
sity for strict security in the prison it was not possible to  have a regime as relaxed as in other 
prisons. It was obvious to us that the subversives' main grievance was the termination of free 
association in prison. When the subversives were first transferred to Portlaoise they enjoyed the 
privilege of free association and some people have argued that subversives in Irish prisons have 
always enjoyed this privilege. This we found to be so, but the subversives at the prison being 
able to associate freely among themselves, were capable of acting cohesively in a disruptive way 
and could take control of the prison at any time . . . .  Consequently we agree that the prison author- 
ities had little choice but to terminate free association... [24]. 
However, the demands for change continued. In March 1977 there was 
a further hunger strike. Twenty prisoners continued the strike for 46 days. 
The situation within the prison came under vocal attack from a number 
of sources within the community  and from the press [ 25 ]. 
Over the next few years the special restrictions on facilities in Portlaoise, 
so often justified as necessary because of the continuing challenge to the 
security of the prison, were to undergo a liberalisation despite the con- 
tinued threat posed by the custody of political prisoners. 
The Change in Regime 
Although the prison authorities denied that these were concessions 
to the hunger strikers' demands, considerable improvements were made 
during 1977 in the facilities for education and recreation within the prison. 
Inmates were also allowed to engage in craft work in their cells as a work 
alternative and the general conditions of cell life were upgraded [26].  
Despite the government's denial that there were any political prisoners 
in the state at that time, the press argued that through the wide use of 
solitary confinement and the strict regime effected in Portlaoise when 
compared with other prisons, the government was de facto according these 
inmates special political status and, as a result, should treat them as being 
a special category. Even in more recent times the Department of Justice 
has not  declared the political characteristics outright but it now represents 
the inmates of Portlaoise as unique [27].  It is this recognition of unique- 
ness that forms the basis for the Republican state's pragmatic solution 
to the custodial problems associated with the imprisonment of  political 
prisoners. 
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Anyone attending Portlaoise prison today will view a quite peculiar 
organisational structure considerably different to anything which prevails 
in other maximum security institutions in Ireland. A journalist who re- 
cently visited Portlaoise made these observations: 
Maybe it is that the rumours of a secret deal on Portlaoise are in fact correct. Certainly the pris- 
oners here have a very different set-up from the inmates of other prisons I have visited. The fact 
that the building is old, overcrowded and depressing, seems almost irrelevant for the moment 
[281. 
Regarding the prison population in Portlaoise and their organisation, he 
continued: 
Portlaoise held 171 subversive prisoners when I visited. The Governor supplied the vital statistics: 
106 Provisionals, (I.R.A.) 23 officials and I.R.S.P?s (Irish Republican Socialist Party) and 42 
non-al igned. . .  95% are Catholics, 43.86% are from the North (and the rest from the Republic). 
Each group is segregated on different landings: Provos on third and fourth, Officials (IRA) and 
IRSP's on the second and non-aligneds on the ground floor landing. 
All prisoners in the Republic can wear their own clothes if they wish. This 
is usually the choice at Portlaoise. As for "freedom of association" within 
the prison at present, the inmates can associate at breakfast. This is un- 
like all other maximum security regimes in the Republic where the norm 
is that prisoners take all their meals alone in their cells. However, the con- 
centration on security at Portlaoise has in no way been generally relaxed. 
Prisoners are not allowed to receive parcels from outside and no teaching 
staff are allowed to visit the gaol. However, the Department of Justice 
does provide advice to those inmates who wish to follow a course of study 
on their own. The various segregated groups within the gaol are also al- 
lowed to organise their own seminars and lectures on a diverse range of 
topics which have covered political/industrial relations, wages, "the origin 
of war," etc. 
Despite the inadequacies which are ever present when a Victorian in- 
stitution is used for the long term containment of a large prison popula- 
tion, Portlaoise has functioned relatively smoothly in recent years. Surely 
this cannot be explained by the improvement in prison conditions alone. 
The improvements are neither comprehensive or dramatic enough to rad- 
ically restore order within a prison that had for so many years been sub- 
ject to serious unrest. I would suggest that the answer lies in the admin- 




In 1979 the Department of Justice stated that: 
The vast majority of the population of the prison (Portlaoise) however is unique in that it is 
capable of acting cohesively in an organised, disruptive and violent manner and, consequently, 
security restrictions could not be relaxed [29]. 
The prison authorities had long been aware of the unique organisational 
structure of the inmate groups in Portlaoise. However this organisation 
had only been recognised in terms of its potential threat to the security 
and good order of the prison. It was not until after the hunger strike in 
1977, and the consequent negotiations that followed, that the clear chain 
of command which exists within the paramilitary groups was seen as func- 
tionally significant from the point of view of prison management. By the 
informal recognition of this paramilitary chain of command which inter- 
nally structured each of the segregated groups, a process of dispute res- 
olution evolved. The prison administration was aware of the discipline 
that gave strength to each inmate group. They had seen its effect when 
directed towards the disruption of the prison. Far more than "con law" 
or any "strong arm" code which may create a hierarchy within the nor- 
mal secured institution, the paramilitary structure of the Portlaoise pop- 
ulation provided both an ideological as well as functional solidarity that 
could not be ignored. 
The pragmatic acceptance by the authorities of this paramilitary dis- 
cipline hierarchy which structures the inmate groups within the prison 
appears to have fostered a communication system of some permanence 
and regularity. The Governor of Portlaoise has been quoted as saying: 
"We meet their O/C's every so often. Each group elect an O/C every three 
months and they come in here. We discuss grievances and problems. It 
generally works pretty well" [30]. 
It is the experience of many prison administrations that order within 
a gaol depends almost entirely on an effective communication process 
throughout all levels of the prison community. It is as essential that the 
Governor be immediately aware of a change in the mood of the prison 
as it is for inmates to be cognizant of, and to understand the rules on which 
the institution operates. Within all closed communities such as a prison 
an informal "pecking order" will develop alongside the imposed institu- 
tional order of the authorities. Such a power structure may be as well 
directed to the maintenance of group order as to the disruption of it. The 
utility of an inmate hierarchy will depend on the clarity of its structure 
and the extent to which its authority and legitimacy are accepted and 
subscribed to. On these criteria the paramilitary groups in Portlaoise are 
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examples of  a powerful sub-order within the prison, comparable in po- 
tential to the authorised power structure. The instances of conflict be- 
tween the inmates and officers in Portlaoise over the last decade give stark 
evidence of  this. Once the prison authorities recognised this operation, 
its utility became apparent. This recognition may have emerged from con- 
flict and the communication entered into as a fait accompli but it has 
developed through its successes into an institutionalised procedure for 
dispute resolution. 
The amelioration of prison conditions in Portlaoise was not a direct 
result of a cycle of aggression and concession. The Department of Jus- 
tice may be technically correct in its statement that the demands made 
by the various hunger strikers in Portlaoise were not  conceded simply 
to resolve the individual disputes. However, if one examines the present 
situation, almost all prison conditions central to these demands have been 
improved to such an extent that a mechanism for compromise can succeed. 
While not  publicly admitting to its recognition of the political status of  
prisoners in Portlaoise, the problems of order and security have been mod- 
erated by recognising their politicality in practice. 
The conflict caused by "criminalization" in Ireland is exemplified in 
Portlaoise and the Maze prison in Belfast. It is there that the most inci- 
dental restrictions or the most minor concession can be viewed by either 
side as a challenge to their legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
There has been a noticeable movement in the administration of the 
criminal sanction since 1945 (in most common law jur isdic t ions)"from 
ideologies of extensive consent to those based more on the exceptional 
forms of domination based principally on law" [31]. As is clearly the 
case in both states of Ireland, the more militant political and economic 
struggle of certain groups within society, coupled with the pervasive weak- 
ness of the economic base, has made it virtually "impossible to manage 
the crisis 'politically' without an escalation of the use of forms of repres- 
sive state power" [32].  
By the obsessive promotion of criminal law as the only appropriate 
basis for social control in terrorist situations, the governments in Ireland 
are constantly engaged in the transmission of arguments to the public, 
establishing the state's right to coercion. However, in so doing, the po- 
litical cost of emphasising the ideology of legality greatly increases the 
political damage which a legitimacy crisis can create. 
With each at tempt by factions within the conflict to undermine or deny 
the legitimacy of the state, its law and legal functionaries, and its bureauc- 
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racy of justice administration, the state reacts by further relying on repres- 
sive power. Traditional institutions are transformed and new mechanisms 
are created for the purpose. 
Political hegemony is maintained not only through the monopolization of force but also through 
received representations that state force is obtained by right. Hegemony is paxtially achieved 
therefore by the articulation of legal-ideological practices on to politics. Legitimacy, the effect 
of the ideology of legality on the political, is founded on the fundamental claim of authority 
that politics is a science inscribed by law [33]. 
In addition, in its quest for legitimacy, the state must represent the 
law as a science, through the processes of its implementation. It is through 
the application of this neutral science, to uncertain issues of conflict, that 
the state can remove dissent and bolster its authority while at the same 
time denying the legitimacy of those who challenge it. 
The state can emphasise its autonomy by relying on the independence 
of the criminal sanction. And even when the sanction is applied through 
unique and sometimes contradictory procedures, it is the law and not 
the political motivation behind it which infects all stages with legitimacy. 
The new state apparatuses are subsumed within the accepted administra- 
tion of the criminal sanction and become defined as anything which con- 
tributes to social cohesion. 
Legality can create legitimation when, and only when, grounds can be produced to show that 
certain formal procedures fulfil certain material claims to justice under certain institutional bound- 
ary conditions [34]. 
When dealing with anti-state activities, the government and administra- 
tion in the "two Irelands" have both developed new "formal procedures" 
that, while claiming to wear the same mantle of justice as other trial pro- 
cesses, are actually designed to ignore and replace some of these fundamen- 
tal "boundary conditions." Therefore the legitimacy claimed by institu- 
tions such as the "Diplock Courts" and the Special Criminal Courts is 
not necessarily conferred simply because they claim to enforce criminal 
law. As Burton and Carlen rather facetiously comment, the changes in 
the procedural rules governing the normal administration of the criminal 
sanction (due process) "are jettisoned in the name of an idealized justice 
via however, a mode of argument that remains within the common-law 
discourse. The controls on the subject-who-is-supposed-to-know, turn 
out to be pragmatic licence" [35]. 
It is even argued by the state that the technical guarantees will inhibit 
the realisation of justice and, in common sense terms, their suspension 
can relocate the administration of justice once again within the proper 
tradition of criminal law. After it has been "demonstrated by the state 
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that the present condition of conflict no longer meshes with the common 
law rules we are witness to an evolutionary mutation: legal selection breaks 
through the technical constraints of the past environment to let justice 
adapt to the current ecology" [36]. 
Yet despite the dangers inherent in this legal mutant, the state returns 
to the rhetoric of the rule of law, to allay fears and criticism. We are told 
that such radical changes are essential "to secure the effective administra- 
tion of justice and the preservation of public peace and order" [37]. 
We are assured that despite the sweeping discretionary powers of arrest 
vested in the armed forces, "they should not be understood as countenanc- 
ing any relaxation of their common law obligations to use no more than 
that amount of force that is necessary in all circumstances to effect the 
arrest" [381. 
It is the real influence and spread of these dangerous hybrids which 
should be a cause of great concern. If it has become easy for the state 
to refer to central protections inherent in the notion of due process, as 
"handicaps," and, in a stroke, to remove them, then what is to stop other 
such protections going the same way? 
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